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Data-driven root-cause analysis for distributed system anomalies
Chao Liu, Kin Gwn Lore, and Soumik Sarkar
Abstract—Modern distributed cyber-physical systems en-
counter a large variety of anomalies and in many cases,
they are vulnerable to catastrophic fault propagation scenarios
due to strong connectivity among the sub-systems. In this
regard, root-cause analysis becomes highly intractable due to
complex fault propagation mechanisms in combination with
diverse operating modes. This paper presents a new data-driven
framework for root-cause analysis for addressing such issues.
The framework is based on a spatiotemporal feature extraction
scheme for distributed cyber-physical systems built on the
concept of symbolic dynamics for discovering and representing
causal interactions among subsystems of a complex system.
We present two approaches for root-cause analysis, namely the
sequential state switching (S3, based on free energy concept of
a Restricted Boltzmann Machine, RBM) and artificial anomaly
association (A3, a multi-class classification framework using
deep neural networks, DNN). Synthetic data from cases with
failed pattern(s) and anomalous node are simulated to validate
the proposed approaches, then compared with the performance
of vector autoregressive (VAR) model-based root-cause analysis.
Real dataset based on Tennessee Eastman process (TEP) is
also used for validation. The results show that: (1) S3 and A3
approaches can obtain high accuracy in root-cause analysis
and successfully handle multiple nominal operation modes,
and (2) the proposed tool-chain is shown to be scalable while
maintaining high accuracy.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of ubiquitous sensing, advanced com-
putation and strong connectivity, modern distributed cyber-
physical systems (CPSs) such as power plants, integrated
buildings, transportation networks and power-grids have
shown tremendous potential of increased efficiency, robust-
ness and resilience. From the perspective of performance
monitoring, anomaly detection and root-cause analysis of
such systems, technical challenges arise from a large number
of subsystems that are highly interactive and operate in
diverse modes.
For the purpose of root-cause analysis in distributed com-
plex systems, Granger causality [1] is applied to model the
system-wide behavior and capture the variation that can be
used to implement root-cause analysis. With multivariate
time series data, studies show that the causality from and to
the fault variable presents differences and can be used to rea-
son the root-cause [20], [13], [8]. For anomaly detection in
time series, Qiu et. al. [14] derived neighborhood similarity
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and coefficient similarity from Granger-Lasso algorithm, to
compute anomaly score and ascertain threshold for anomaly
detection. A causality analysis index based on dynamic
time warping is proposed by Li et. al. [9] to determine
the causal direction between pairs of faulty variables in
order to overcome the shortcoming of Granger causality in
nonstationary time series. The proposed approaches provide
efficient tools in discovering causality in complex systems,
while an approach in inferencing (interpreting the variation
in causality into decisions on failed patterns of fault vari-
able/node) is less investigated.
In this context, we present a semi-supervised tool for root-
cause analysis in distributed CPSs based on a data driven
framework proposed for system-wide anomaly detection in
distributed complex system [11], and using a spatiotemporal
feature extraction scheme built on the concept of symbolic
dynamics for discovering and representing causal interactions
between the subsystems. The proposed tool aims to (i)
capture multiple operating modes as nominal in complex
CPSs, (ii) only use nominal data and artificially generated
fault data to train the model without requiring true labeled
anomalous data, and (iii) implement root-cause analysis in
a semi-supervised way in a diversity of fault types (e.g.,
single fault and multiple faults). We present two approaches
for root-cause analysis, namely the sequential state switching
(S3, based on free energy concept of a Restricted Boltzmann
Machine, RBM [5]) and artificial anomaly association (A3,
a multi-class classification framework using deep neural
networks, DNN).
2. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Spatiotemporal pattern network (STPN)
STPN modeling involves learning sequential character-
istics in a univariate and pairwise manner from a multi-
dimensional time-series data. While details can be found
in [17], [10], we are providing a brief description here for
completeness.
Consider a multivariate time series, X = {XA(t), t ∈ N,
A = 1, 2, · · · , n}, where n is the number of variables or
dimension of the time series, corresponding to the number
of nodes in graphical modeling. Let X denote a set of par-
titioning/discretization functions [15], X : X(t) → S, that
transform a general dynamic system (time series X(t)) into
a symbol sequence S with an alphabet set Σ. Various parti-
tioning approaches have been proposed in the literature, such
as uniform partitioning (UP), maximum entropy partition-
ing (MEP, used for the present study), maximally bijective
discretization (MBD) and statistically similar discretization
(SSD) [18]. Subsequently, a probabilistic finite state automa-
ton (PFSA) is defined to describe states (representing various
parts of the data space) and probabilistic transitions among
them (can be learnt from data) via D-Markov machine and
xD-Markov machine. Related definitions and further details
on learning schemes can be found in [17]. With this setup,
an STPN is defined as:
Definition. A PFSA based STPN is a 4-tuple WD ≡
(Qa,Σb,Πab,Λab): (a, b denote nodes of the STPN)
1) Qa = {q1, q2, · · · , q|Qa|} is the state set corresponding
to symbol sequences Sa [17].
2) Σb = {σ0, · · · , σ|Σb|−1} is the alphabet set of symbol
sequence Sb.
3) Πab is the symbol generation matrix of size |Qa|×|Σb|,
the ijth element of Πab denotes the probability of
finding the symbol σj in the symbol string s
b while
making a transition from the state qi in the symbol
sequence Sa; while self-symbol generation matrices
are called atomic patterns (APs) i.e., when a = b,
cross-symbol generation matrices are called relational
patterns (RPs) i.e., when a 6= b.
4) Λab denotes a metric that can represent the importance
of the learnt pattern (or degree of causality) for a→ b
which is a function of Πab.
An example of the STPN model is shown in [10].
B. Unsupervised anomaly detection with spatiotemporal
causal graphical modeling
A data-driven framework for system-wide anomaly detec-
tion is proposed in [10], noted as the STPN+RBM model,
including the following steps:
1) Learn APs and RPs (individual node behaviors and
pair-wise interaction behaviors) from the multivariate
training symbol sequences.
2) Consider short symbol sub-sequences from the training
sequences and evaluate Λij ∀i, j for each short sub-
sequence.
3) For one sub-sequence, based on a user-defined thresh-
old on Λij , assign state 0 or 1 for each AP and RP;
thus every sub-sequence leads to a binary vector of
length L, where L = #AP +#RP .
4) An RBM is used for modeling system-wide behavior
with nodes in the visible layer corresponding to APs
and RPs.
5) The RBM is trained using binary vectors generated
from nominal training sub-sequences.
6) Online anomaly detection is implemented by comput-
ing the probability of occurrence of a test STPN pattern
vector via trained RBM.
The anomaly detection process and details can be found
in [10].
3. METHODS
A. Root-cause analysis problem formulation
With the definition of STPN in Section 2-A, an inference
based metric is employed for evaluating the patterns (APs &
RPs) [10]. The inference based metric computation includes
a modeling phase and an inference phase. In the modeling
phase, the time-series in the nominal condition is applied,
noted as X = {XA(t), t ∈ N, A = 1, 2, · · · , f}, where f is
the number of variables or the dimension of the time series.
The time series is then symbolized into S = {SA} and then
state sequences are generated with the STPN formulation,
noted by Q = {Qa, a = 1, 2, · · · , f}. In the learning phase,
short time-series is considered, X˜ = {X˜A(t) for the short
time-series in nominal condition, t ∈ N∗, A = 1, 2, · · · , f},
where N∗ is a subset of N, and Xˆ = {XˆA(t) for the short
time-series in anomalous condition. The corresponding short
symbolic subsequences is noted as S˜ = {S˜A} and Sˆ = {SˆA}
for nominal condition and anomalous condition respectively,
and the state sequences Q˜ and Q¯ correspondingly. An impor-
tance metric Λab is defined, which suggests the importance
of the pattern Πab or the degree of causality in a → b as
evidenced by the short subsequence.
The inference based metric Λab(Q˜, S˜) for a pattern a→ b
can be obtained as follows [10],
Λab(Q˜, S˜) =
K
|Qa|∏
m=1
(N˜abm )!(N
ab
m + |Σ
b| − 1)!
(N˜abm +N
ab
m + |Σ
b| − 1)!
|Σb|∏
n=1
(N˜abmn +N
ab
mn)!
(N˜abmn)!(N
ab
mn)!
(1)
where, K is a proportional constant, Nabmn ,
|{(Qa(k), Sb(k + 1) : Sb(k + 1) = σbn | Q
a(k) = qam}|,
Nabm =
∑|Σb|
n=1(N
ab
mn), N˜
ab
mn and N˜
ab
m are similar to N
ab
mn
and Nabm , |Q
a| is number of states in state sequence Q˜, and
|Σb| is number of symbols in symbol sequence S˜.
For an anomalous condition, the inference based metric
Λˆab(Qˆ, Sˆ) for a pattern a→ b is obtained as follows,
Λˆab(Qˆ, Sˆ) =
K
|Qa|∏
m=1
(Nˆabm )!(N
ab
m + |Σ
b| − 1)!
(Nˆabm +N
ab
m + |Σ
b| − 1)!
|Σb|∏
n=1
(Nˆabmn +N
ab
mn)!
(Nˆabmn)!(N
ab
mn)!
(2)
where Nˆ is with the similar definition in Eq. 2, while it
is emanated from the time series Xˆ = {XˆA(t), t ∈ N∗,
A = 1, 2, · · · , f} in the anomalous condition.
Let δ
(
ln(Λab)
)
denote the variation of the metric,
δ
(
ln(Λab)
)
= ln
(
Λab(Q˜, S˜)
)
− ln
(
Λˆab(Qˆ, Sˆ)
)
. We also
define the set of all metrics in the nominal condition as
Λ = {Λab} ∀a, b and the set of all metrics in the anomalous
condition as Λˆ = {Λˆab} ∀a, b.
The main idea behind the proposed root-cause analysis
algorithm is to perturb the space of test (anomalous) patterns
in an artificial manner to bring it close to the space of
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nominal patterns. During this process, we aim to identify the
nodes/patterns involved in successful perturbations that bring
the test pattern space sufficiently close to the space of nom-
inal patterns. Then we label those identified nodes/patterns
as the possible root-cause(s) for the detected anomaly. More
formally, let us suppose that an inference metric Λˆab changes
to Λˆab′ due to an artificial perturbation in the pattern a→ b.
We now consider a subset of patterns, for which we have the
set of inference metrics {Λˆab} ⊂ Λˆ. Let a perturbation in this
subset changes the overall set of metrics to Λˆ′. Therefore,
we have the following:
Λˆ′ =
{
Λˆab if Λˆab 6∈ {Λˆab}
Λˆab′ if Λˆab ∈ {Λˆab}
(3)
The root cause analysis is then formulated as a minimiza-
tion problem between the set of nominal inference metrics
Λ and the set of perturbed inference metrics Λˆ′ which can
be expressed as follows:
{Λˆab}⋆ = min
{Λˆab}
D
(
Λˆ′,Λ
)
, (4)
where D is a distance metric (e.g., Kullback-Leibler
Distance–KLD[7], [3]) to estimate the difference between
Λ and Λˆ′. The nodes (e.g., a or b) or patterns (e.g., a→ b)
involved in the optimal subset {Λˆab}⋆ will be identified as
possible root cause(s) for the detected anomaly. However,
solving this optimization problem in an exact manner may
not be computationally tractable for large systems. Therefore,
we propose two approximate algorithms: the sequential state
switching (S3) - a sequential suboptimal search method
and artificial anomaly association (A3) - a semi-supervised
learning based method.
B. Sequential state switching (S3)
In the STPN+RBM framework described above, anomaly
manifests itself as a low probability (high energy) event.
Therefore, the idea for S3 is to find potential pattern(s) that,
if changed, can transition the system from a high to a low
energy state. The probabilities of AP and RP’s existence are
discovered by the STPN, and an anomaly will influence the
causality of specific patterns (e.g., in STPN, the probability
of the pattern might be switched/flipped from 0 to 1). Hence,
by switching/flipping a pattern, its contribution on the energy
states of the system can be identified and a large contribution
may indicate the root-cause of an anomaly.
For an n-node graphical model, all the APs and RPs
together form a binary vector v of length L = n2 (L =
#AP + #RP , where #AP = n, #RP = n × (n − 1)).
One such binary vector is treated as one training example for
the system-wide RBM (with n2 number of visible units) and
many such examples are generated from different short sub-
sequences extracted from the overall training sequence. Then,
the RBM is trained by maximizing the maximum likelihood
of the data.
With the weights and biases of RBM, free energy can be
computed with the following expression [6]:
F (v) = −
∑
i
viai −
∑
j
log(1 + ebj+
∑
i
viwij ) (5)
The free energy in nominal conditions is noted as F˜ . In
anomalous conditions, a failed pattern will shift the energy
from a lower state to a higher state. Assume that the patterns
can be categorized into two sets, vnom and vano. By flipping
the set of anomalous patterns vano, a new expression for free
energy is obtained:
F s(v) =−
∑
g
vgag −
∑
j
log(1 + ebj+
∑
g
vgwgj )
−
∑
h
v⋆hah −
∑
j
log(1 + ebj+
∑
h
v⋆hwhj ),
{vg} ∈ v
nom, {v⋆h} ∈ v
⋆,ano
(6)
Here, v⋆ has the opposite state to v and represents that the
probability of the pattern has been significantly changed. In
this work, the probabilities of the patterns are binary (i.e. 0
or 1). Hence, we have that v⋆ = 1− v. The sequential state
switching is formulated by finding a set of patterns vano via
min(F s(vano, vnom)− F˜ ). With bijection function between
input units of RBM (v) and patterns in STPN (Λ, Λa,a for
AP and Λa,b for RP), failed patterns in STPN can be inferred.
C. Artificial anomaly association (A3)
In this proposed approach, we frame the root-cause analy-
sis problem as a supervised classification problem [12]. The
crux of the idea is that anomalies are artificially injected
(by introducing anomalous patterns) into the learnt nominal
model and label it with that particular anomaly. Then we
employ a supervised learning method to map the entire space
of nominal-anomalous patterns to the space of labels. Upon
learning, this map can be used to detect the root cause (as
the labels) given a test nominal-anomalous pattern. Since
all possible anomalous data is mostly infeasible to obtain
for a real system, the proposed synthetic scheme provides
a useful alternative. Regarding the choice of supervised
learning scheme, we note that realistic physical systems
may have multiple nominal nodes and it will most certainly
be arduous to extract important features from the nominal-
anomalous patterns to obtain sufficiently high accuracy. In
this context, we turn our attention to deep learning methods.
Artificial anomaly association is based on a method pro-
posed in [12] to solve a multi-label classification problem
using convolutional neural networks (CNN). Instead of in-
ferring a single class from the trained model, the framework
solves nout classification sub-problems if an output vector of
length nout is required using the previously learned model.
The implementation of this formulation requires only a slight
modification in the loss function: for an output sequence with
length nout, the loss function to be minimized for a data set
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D is the negative log-likelihood defined as:
ℓtotal(θ = {W, b},D) =
−
np∑
j=1
|D|∑
i=0
[
log
(
P (Y = y(i)|x(i),W, b)
)]
j
(7)
whereD denotes the training set, θ is the model parameters
with W as the weights and b for the biases. y is predicted
target vector whereas x is the provided input pattern. The
total loss is computed by summing the individual losses for
each sub-label.
The input is presented as an n2-element vector with
values of either 0 or 1 which denotes whether a specific
pattern is activated. We desire to map the input vector to an
output vector of the same length (termed as the indicator
label), where the value of each element within the output
vector indicates whether a specific pattern is anomalous.
For nominal modes, the input vector may be comprised of
different combinations of 0’s and 1’s, and the indicator labels
will be a vector of all 1’s (where the value 1 denotes no
anomaly). However, if a particular element i within the input
vector gets flipped, then the indicator label corresponding to
the i-th position in the output vector will be flipped and
switches from 1 (normal) to 0 (anomalous). In this way, we
can identify that the i-th pattern is anomalous. With this
setup, a classification sub-problem (i.e. is this pattern normal,
or anomalous?) can be solved for each element in the output
vector given the input data.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Synthetic datasets are generated with vector autoregressive
(VAR) process to simulate anomaly in pattern(s)/node(s) for
performance evaluation of S3 andA3 methods. The inference
with VAR is then used for comparison. A dataset based on
TEP is also used in validating the proposed methods.
A. Anomaly in pattern(s)
Dataset: Anomaly in pattern(s) is defined as the change
of one or more causal relationship, while defining anomaly,
this translates to a changed/switched pattern in the context
of STPN. A 5-node system is defined including six different
nominal modes. Anomalies are simulated by breaking spe-
cific patterns in the graph; 30 cases are formed including 5
cases in one failed pattern, 10 cases in two failed patterns, 10
cases in three failed patterns, and 5 cases in four failed pat-
terns. Multivariate time series data (denoted as dataset1)
are generated using VAR process that follows the causality
definition in the graphical models.
Performance Evaluation: Root-cause identification per-
formances of S3 and A3 methods are evaluated using
dataset1. Recall, precision and F-measure are evaluated
with the definitions in [2].
High accuracy is obtained for both S3 and A3 method,
as shown in Table I. While training time is much less for
TABLE I
ROOT-CAUSE ANALYSIS RESULTS IN S3 METHOD AND A3 METHOD.
Method Training/Testing Recall Precision F-measure
S3 11,400/57,000 99.40% 97.10% 98.24%
A3 296,400/57,000 90.46% 95.95% 93.12%
S3, the inference time in root-cause analysis for S3 is much
more than that of A3, as S3 depends on sequential searching.
Note, the classification formulation in A3 aims to achieve
the exact set of anomalous nodes. On the other hand, the S3
method is an approximate method that sequentially identifies
anomalous patterns and hence, the stopping criteria would be
critical. The observation that the performance of S3 is quite
comparable to that of A3 suggests a reasonable choice of the
stopping criteria.
B. Anomaly in node(s)
Dataset: Anomaly in node(s) occurs when one node or
multiple nodes fail in the system. VAR process is applied
to define a graphical model for generating the nominal data.
Anomaly data are simulated by introducing time delay in a
specific node. The time delay will break most of the causality
to and from this node (except possibly the self loop, i.e.,
AP of the failed node). The generated dataset is denoted as
dataset2. For scalability analysis, a 30-node system is
defined.
Performance Evaluation: This work is aimed at discov-
ering failed patterns instead of recovering underlying graph.
The discovered anomalous patterns can then be used for
diagnosing the fault node. For instance, a failed pattern
Ni → Nj discovered by root-cause analysis can be caused
by the fault node i or j. However, if multiple failed patterns
are related to the node i, then this node can be deemed
anomalous. In this regard, it is important to learn the impact
of one pattern on a detected anomaly compared to another.
This can facilitate a ranking of the failed patterns and enable
a robust isolation of an anomalous node.
For comparison, we use VAR-based graph recovery
method that is widely applied in economics and other sci-
ences, and efficient in discovering Granger causality [4].
Note, the test dataset itself is synthetically generated using a
VAR model with a specific time delay. Hence, the causality
in such a multivariate time series is supposed to be well
captured by VAR-based method.
With the given time series, a VAR model (i.e., the co-
efficients Ai,j) can be learnt using standard algorithm [4].
The differences in coefficients between the nominal and
anomalous models are subsequently used to find out the
root causes. The pattern is deemed to have failed when
δAi,j > 0.4 ·max{δAi,j} where δAi,j = |A
ano
i,j −A
nom
i,j |.
The results of A3, S3 and VAR using dataset2 are
shown in Fig. 2. In panel (a), all of the changed patterns
discovered by VAR, A3 and S3 can be attributed to node 1
4
01
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1 0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0 1
0 1
10
10
Nominal Anomaly
DNN DNNClassification 
Layer
Classification 
Layer
Input Vector Indicator 
Label
Indicator 
Label
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0 0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0 1
0 1
Test Data
DNN Classification 
Layer
(a) Training Procedure (a) Inference
Decision: Patterns 3 and 5 are faulty
Input Vector
Softmax Softmax
Fig. 1. Framing the problem as an artificial anomaly association (A3) problem. (a) When training the model, the value of an element in both the
input vector and its corresponding indicator label is randomly flipped to simulate anomaly. (b) When inferencing, a test input is fed into the DNN and a
classification sub-problem is solved to obtain the indicator vector. Values of 0 in the output vector traces back to the exact patterns that are faulty.
1 6 11 16 21 26
Node (tail)
1
6
11
16
21
26
N
od
e 
(he
ad
)
A3
1 6 11 16 21 26
Node (tail)
1
6
11
16
21
26
N
od
e 
(he
ad
)
S3
1 6 11 16 21 26
Node (tail)
1
6
11
16
21
26
N
od
e 
(he
ad
)
VAR
(a) Fault in Node 2
1 6 11 16 21 26
Node (tail)
1
6
11
16
21
26
N
od
e 
(he
ad
)
A3
1 6 11 16 21 26
Node (tail)
1
6
11
16
21
26
N
od
e 
(he
ad
)
S3
1 6 11 16 21 26
Node (tail)
1
6
11
16
21
26
N
od
e 
(he
ad
)
VAR
(b) Fault in Node 5
Fig. 2. Comparisons of VAR, A3, and S3 methods using dataset2.
The boxes represent the patterns from the tail node (shown in x-axis) to
the head node (shown in y-axis), and the results of root-cause analysis are
in black. The gray boxes are corresponding to the simulated fault node.
(shown by the black boxes in column and row 1). Therefore,
node 1 is considered as faulty by the S3 method. In panel
(b), VAR incorrectly discovers a significant change in the
patterns in rows 4 and 6 but not the patterns originating from
N5 (We note these as errors), while A
3 and S3 can correctly
interpret the fault node N5. In general, although A
3, S3 and
VAR can discover the fault node, VAR produces more false
alarms.
TABLE II
COMPARISON WITH A3 , S3 AND VAR WITH DATASET 2 (30 NODES).
Approach |{Λano}| |{Λǫ}| ǫ (%)
VAR 521 113 21.7
A3 105 1 0.95
S3 653 0 0
In real applications, when more anomalous patterns are
discovered incorrectly, more effort will be needed to analyze
the failed patterns closely and determine the root-cause
node. This will lead to more financial expenditures and time
investment in finding the failed node. With this motivation,
an error metric ǫ is defined by computing the ratio of incor-
rectly discovered anomalous patterns |{Λǫ}| to all discovered
anomalous patterns |{Λano}|, i.e., ǫ = |{Λ
ǫ}|
|{Λano}| . The results
using dataset2 are listed in Table II.
The approach in [14] can give the anomalous node in
the graphical model. If we do node-based root cause anal-
ysis, then the results can be compared. For now, we only
have pattern based root cause analysis. Our approaches are
promising in diagnosing fault node, as shown in Fig. 2. We
may get better results in finding out the fault node than [14].
Compared to [21], [20], we have an automatic algorithm to
discover the root cause.
While it should be noted that the error ratio for A3 and
S3 methods is much lower than that for VAR (i.e., lower
false alarm). A3 and S3 methods are both scalable as well
as demonstrates better accuracy. For comparisons between
A3, S3 and VAR, only one nominal mode is considered in
Table II as VAR is not directly applicable in cases with
multiple nominal modes. A3 and S3 methods can handle
multiple nominal modes and the approach has been validated
in Section 4-A.
C. Validation on a Real System - TEP
TEP data is based on a realistic simulation program of a
chemical plant from the Eastman Chemical Company, USA,
and it has been widely used for process monitoring commu-
nity as a source of data for comparing various approaches,
and a benchmark for control and monitoring studies [16],
[19]. The process consists of five major units: reactor, con-
denser, compressor, separator, and stripper, with 53 variables
simulated including 41 measured and 12 manipulated (the
agitation speed is not included in TEP dataset as it is not
manipulated). 21 faults are simulated in TEP program, as
the root causes of these faults are intuitively shown in [16].
This work applies a subset of measurements (5 variables–
22, 32, 48, 49, 51 treated as nodes 1 through 5 respectively)
to validate the proposed approaches, and 2 faults (fault 4 and
11) are tested. Note, both faults 4 an 11 involves variable 51
(or node 5 in the present analysis) according to the ground
truth.
Using A3 and S3, root-cause analysis results are shown
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Fig. 3. Root-cause analysis results using A3 and S3 with TEP dataset.
The boxes represent the patterns from the tail node (shown in x-axis) to the
head node (shown in y-axis), and the results of root-cause analysis are in
black. The gray boxes are corresponding to the fault node (representing the
variable that most closely related to the fault, shown in [16], e.g., panel the
fault occurs at Node 5 in panel (a), the patterns that include Node 5 as the
head or the tail are and the potential fault patterns and marked as grey).
in Fig. 3. In panel (a), Node 5 is the variable most closely
related to the fault, and patterns N5 → N2, N2, N3, N4 →
N5 are identified as fault by S
3. The identified fault patterns
will result in root cause of Fault Node 5, as it is the shared
Node in each pattern. Similarly, variable 5 is the fault node
in panel (b). In panel (c) and (d), the results are similar,
while there is one error pattern in each case.
The results of the real dataset show that both A3 and S3
are capable of finding the root-cause of the patterns that can
be reasonably interpreted to obtain the fault variable.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Based on spatiotemporal causal graphical modeling, this
work presents two approaches–the sequential state switch-
ing (S3) and artificial anomaly association (A3)–for root-
cause analysis in distributed CPSs. While S3 approaches the
problem in a sub-optimal sequential manner, A3 takes all
patterns jointly. However, experimental evidence presented
here suggests that S3 performs slightly better than A3. With
synthetic data and real data, the proposed approaches are
validated and showed high accuracy in finding failed patterns
and diagnose for the anomalous node. Advantages of the
proposed methods include -
1) Ability to handle multiple nominal modes: The STPN+
RBM framework is capable of learning multiple modes
as nominal, which corresponds to diverse operation
modes in most physical systems.
2) Accuracy: The proposed approaches–S3 and A3–
demonstrate high accuracy in root-causes analysis.
3) Scalability: The approaches are scalable with the size
of the system.
4) Robustness: Compared with VAR model, the proposed
approach can more effectively isolate the fault node
with less incorrectly discovered patterns.
Future work will pursue: (i) inference approach in node
failure including single node and multiple nodes, (ii) detec-
tion and root-cause analysis of simultaneous multiple faults
in distributed complex systems.
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